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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
against a competitor's standing to challenge a rival's authority to engage
in his business; one might observe that neither opinion reflects this
policy and hence might be led to question its continuing vitality.
Justices Brennan and White would restrict the test for standing to
examination of whether plaintiff was injured in fact by the administrative
action challenged.' 21 Statutory history and interpretation, the Justices
argued, is a nonconstitutional requisite for standing and is more properly
relevant to the issue of reviewability. Justice Brennan stated, "Review-
ability has often been treated as if it involved a single issue: whether
agency action is conclusive and beyond judicial challenge by anyone. In
reality, however, reviewability is equally concerned with a second issue:
whether the particular plaintiff then requesting review may have it.'
1 22
While this structural analysis would aid determinations of standing, it
would seem merely to defer the difficulties of the majority's approach to
the issue of review-unless both standing and reviewability are to be
"favorably presumed" away.
The opinion in Data Processing Service should serve to eliminate the
circular reasoning resulting from the legal-right approach to standing, and
the decision's emphasis on segregation of the issues of standing and review-
ability may prove helpful. But it is doubtful that the obscure test proposed
to guide the lower courts' determinations of those issues will prove
effective. Clear standards have yet to be formulated.
DAVID G. CROCKETT
The Requirement and Techniques for Holding an Adversary Hearing
Prior to Seizure of Obscene Material
INTRODUCTION
Since the United States Supreme Court's decision in A Quantity of
Books v. Kansa' in 1964, the constitutionally sanctioned procedure by
which material alleged to be obscene may be seized has become increasingly
confused. That decision established a constitutional guideline to ensure
an adequate "safeguard against the suppression of non obscene books"2 by
121 This view has long been urged by Professor Davis regarding standing under
the "person-aggrieved" provisions of the APA. See K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW § 22.02 (1958).
12 Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 38
U.S.L.W. 4198 n.2 (U.S. March 3, 1970) (concurring and dissenting opinion).
1378 U.S. 205 (1964).
'Id. at 208.
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criminal prosecution or injunction. It is now clear that publications-and,
by extension, motion pictures3 -may not be seized prior to a judicial ad-
versary proceeding in which the materials are in fact found to be obscene.4
This procedure is difficult to follow in North Carolina since there is no
explicit statutory scheme providing a forum for such an adversary hear-
ing.
Before examining the various constitutional problems emanating from
attempts to seize allegedly obscene materials, it is necessary briefly to
discuss some of the problems that have plagued inferior courts, local
prosecutors, and law enforcement officials when they have tried to enforce
statutes prohibiting the dissemination and showing of obscene material.
The Supreme Court has set out a broadly-worded test to determine whether
an item arguably protected by the first amendment is obscene and has
further complicated the matter by reserving to appellate courts the final
determination of the question of obscenity. According to the Court:
[T]hree elements must coalesce: it must be established that (a) the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient
interest in sex, (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts
contemporary community standards relating to the description or
representation of sexual matters, and (c) the material is utterly with-
out redeeming social value.
Evidence that the book was commercially exploited for sake of prurient
appeal to the exclusion of all other values might justify the con-
clusion that the book was utterly without redeeming social impor-
tance .... [W]here the purveyor's sole emphasis is on the sexually
provocative aspects of his publications a court could accept his evalua-
tions at face value.5
Since the Court established this standard for application when first-
amendment rights are involved, books,6 magazines,7 and motion pictures'
'Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Bethview Amusement
Corp. v. Cahn, 416 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1969); Tyrone, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 410 F.2d
639 (4th Cir. 1969); Metzger v. Pearcy, 393 F.2d 202 (7th Cir. 1968); Cambist
Films, Inc. v. Tribel, 293 F. Supp. 407 (E.D. Ky. 1968); Cambist Films, Inc. v.
Illinois, 292 F. Supp. 185 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
'See, e.g., Tyrone, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 410 F.2d 639 (4th Cir. 1969).
'A Book Named "James Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v.
Attorney General of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418, 420 (1966).
'E.g., Childs v. Oregon, 300 F. Supp. 649 (D. Ore. 1969).
"E.g., People v. Stabile, 58 Misc. 2d 905, 296 N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y. Cty. Crim.
Ct. 1969).
'E.g., Cambist Films, Inc. v. Illinois, 292 F. Supp. 185 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
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are the most frequent examples of items measured according to it. Gov-
ernmental attacks on obscenity, of course, have been extended to areas
not necessarily protected by the first amendment. A bare breast displayed
in public in Newark may be obscene9 while one of presumably the same
magnitude in San Francisco is not."° Lesbian gadgets, probably not pro-
tected by the first amendment, have also been declared obscene." These
examples illustrate the need for judicial flexibility in devising other appro-
priate tests for obscenity that fit the subject matter at issue.
THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACT
The Supreme Court's insistence on its determining the question of
obscenity at the appellate level arises from fear of abridgment of first-
amendment rights.'2 The issue of obscenity is typically a question of fact
to be submitted to the jury.13 Although findings of fact are normally
binding in subsequent appeals,' 4 when there are at issue "rights derived
from the First Amendment guarantees of free expression, [the Court]
cannot avoid making an independent constitutional judgment on the facts
of the case as to whether the material involved is constitutionally pro-
tected."' 5 Mr. Justice Harlan explained the Court's view when he stated
in a concurring opinion in Roth v. United States'" that if "obscenity is to
9 Adams Newark Theatre Co. v. City of Newark, 22 N.J. 472, 126 A.2d 340
(1956)."0See, e.g., In re Giannini, 69 Cal. 2d 563, 446 P.2d 535, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655
(1968).11 People v. Clark, 60 Misc. 2d 1073, 304 N.Y.S.2d 326 (N.Y. Cty. Crim. Ct.
1969).
2 See, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
" See, e.g., United States v. A Motion Picture Film, 404 F.2d 196 (2d Cir.
1968).
The burden placed on the jury and the trial judge in determining the issue of
obscenity is very great and may be seen clearly in a case in which the jury was
called up to decide the obscenity of 289 separate publications. The judge, describing
the problem, stated:
To lighten the burden of the reader, we will not attempt a weary descrip-
tion of the magazines here involved. A random selection of titles will
suffice to present a kaleideoscope of the genre we have to deal with: Black
Satin, The Body Shop, Busty, Cuddle Bug, Diamond Stud, Frenchy, Hip
& Toe, Imp, Man's Favorite Pastime, Masher, Nymph, Pagan, Sultry,
Slave, Undie World, and last but far from least, Wow 1 Multiply these titles
by the proliferation of other titles, and it is not difficult to fathom the
spectrum placed before the jury in this action.
Olsen v. Doerfler, 14 Mich. App. 428, -, 165 N.W.2d 648, 650 (1968)."United States v. A Motion Picture Film, 404 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1968).
'5 jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 190 (1964).
16354 U.S. 476 (1957) (concurring opinion).
[Vol. 48
OBSCENITY HEARINGS BEFORE SEIZURE
be suppressed, the question whether a particular work is of that character
involves not really an issue of fact, but a question of constitutional
judgment of the most sensitive and delicate kind. '17 The doctrine of
constitutional fact'8 permits judicial reyiew of the issue of obscenity
throughout all stages 9f the appellate pocess"9 and leads to greater coni-
fusion and uncertainty.
Two cases can be used to illustrate the application of the doctrine. In
United States v. A Motion Picture Film,20 a jury, applying the current
test for obscenity,2 had found the 'movie "I Am Curious (Yellow)"
obscene. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ignored
the jury's decision by ruling that ". . . obscenity vel non -is not an issue
of fact with respect to which the jury's finding has its usual conclusive
effect. It is rather an issue of constitutional law that must eventually be
decided by the court.' 22 In State v. Childs,23 the Oregon Supreme Court
dismissed the necessity for expert testimony to aid the jury in deter-
mining what the national contemporary standard is, and further stated
that "[to] say that the average juror is not cognizant of the contemporary
national community and what it will tolerate is to deny the present mass
dissemination of information. Under proper instructions, the jury is
qualified to weigh a particular book or movie."'24 But the federal district
court, acting on a writ of habeas corpus, thought otherwise. Stating that
the book did not appeal to prurient interests and did not go beyond con-
temporary community standards, the district court overturned the juii?s
verdict and held that the work was not obscene.25
17 Id. at 497-98 (original emphasis).
" For a discussion of the theory of constitutional fact, see Strong, Diiemiic
Aspects of the Doctrine of "Constitutionad Fact," 47 N.C.L. REv. 311 (1969).
'" It should also be noted that the redetermination of the issue of obscenity ii
not limited to the appellate process. One disgruntled federal district judge did
not feel bound by a ruling on the issue of obscenity made by a neighboring federal
district court. Some of the magazines on trial had been classified previously as
nonobscene, but the judge ruled them obscene anyway. Venting his disgust about
the earlier decision of the neighboring court, he said, "[O]ne of the magazines
offered by claimant as previously approved . . . is entitled 'Pussy Cat.' It is the
Court's belief that the title would be more accurate if the word 'Cat' were deleted."
United States v. 77 Cartons of Magazines, 300 F. Supp. 851, 854 (N.D. Cal.
1969).2'4 04 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1968).
2 See text at note 5 supra.
2 404 F.2d at 199.
' - Ore. -, 447 P.2d 304 (1969).
'Id. at -, 447 P.2d at 310.
" Childs v. Oregon, 300 F. Supp. 649 (D. Ore. 1969).
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PROBLEMS SURROUNDING THE ADVERSARY HEARING
The requirement of an adversary hearing prior to the seizure of
allegedly obscene books, enunciated in A Quantity of Books v. Kansas,20
was extended to attempts to seize motion pictures by the Court's subse-
quent per curiam decision in Lee Art Theaters, Inc. v. Virginia.7 In that
case, the Court ruled that a warrant issued by a magistrate upon the
affidavit of a police officer who had viewed the entire film was insufficient
to support its seizure. Lee Art Theaters had been interpreted by three
federal courts of appeals 28 to hold that even if the magistrate himself views
the film before issuing the warrant, it is invalid since the defendant has
not been afforded an opportunity for an adversary hearing.
In Tyrone, Inc. v. Wilkinson29 the commonwealth's attorney and
the Richmond chief of police had secured an apparently valid search
warrant for the film "Angelique in Black Leather." The warrant was
issued upon the affidavits of four police officers and two lawyers who
had seen the film by a magistrate who had also viewed it. Upon the basis
of this warrant, the film was seized, and the theater was charged with
possessing and exhibiting an obscene motion picture. The theater re-
sponded with an action under title 42, section 1983, of the United States
Code.30 It claimed that an adversary hearing to determine obscenity was
required before the film could be seized and that the seizure, and threats
of its repetition would result in the suppression of nonobscene material.
The defendants requested the return of the film and an injunction against
further criminal prosecutions by the state. The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit ordered the state to return the motion picture and pro-
hibited the seizure of any other film until the question of obscenity had
been determined. However, the court refused to enjoin criminal prosecu-
28378 U.S. 205 (1964).
27392 U.S. 636 (1968).
28 Bethview Amusement Park v. Cahn, 416 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1969) ; Tyrone,
Inc. v. Wilkinson, 410 F.2d 639 (4th Cir. 1969); Metzger v. Pearcy, 393 F.2d 202
(7th Cir. 1968).
28410 F.2d 639 (4th Cir. 1969).
2SEvery person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
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tions 1 and further ordered that the theater deliver to the commonwealth's
attorney, upon request, a copy of the movie for reasonable use in the
preparation and trial of the charges then pending in the state courts.2
The requirement of an adversary hearing before material can be seized
prior to the actual criminal trial in effect presents a defendant with two
opportunities below the appellate level to be found not guilty of a charge
based on obscenity. If the material is found to be nonobscene at the
prior hearing, then the charges must be dropped, and no further action
can be taken against the defendant. Even if the material is determined
obscene at the prior hearing, this decision is not binding at the subsequent
criminal trial because the hearing would not have been a fully matured
action at law.' At trial the defendant will receive a second opportunity
to defend on the ground that the material is protected by the first amend-
ment, and the issue of obscenity will have to be submitted to a jury. 4 If
the material is found to be obscene at the trial, the defendant still can make
use of all other defenses that may exist. Finally, if the defendant is con-
victed, an appellate court may still re-examine the issue of obscenity. This
procedure, as outlined by the federal courts, is designed to give the
defendant every possible opportunity to defend the item in order to "safe-
guard against governmental suppression of non obscene [material] .,"
The problem of the unavailability of the adversary hearing due to
11 The question whether suits under section 1983 constitute an exception to 28
U.S.C. § 2283 (1964), so that a federal court may enjoin a state prosecution, has
been expressly left open by the Supreme Court. Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S.
611, 613 n.3 (1968); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2 (1965). The
Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have held that section 1983 does not create an
exception. Tyrone, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 410 F.2d 639 (4th Cir. 1969); Sexton v.
Barry, 233 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1956); Gross v. Illinois, 312 F.2d 257 (7th Cir.
1963). On the other hand, the Third Circuit has held that section 1983 is an
exception. Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1950).
" Tyrone, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 410 F.2d 639, 640-41 (4th Cir. 1969).
" Application of collateral estoppel to the determination of the issue of obscenity
has been rejected. One judge noted that some of the same magazines on which he
was ruling had been determined nonobscene in two unreported federal district court
cases, but he ruled them all obscene anyway. United States v. 77 Cartons of Maga-
zines, 300 F. Supp. 851 (N.D. Cal. 1969). This same rationale should be followed in
determining the effect of an adversary hearing on a later criminal trial; i.e., the
prior judicial determination of obscenity should have no effect at the trial on
instructions to the jury or on its verdict. As an added precaution against prejudice,
the judicial official who determines the question of obscenity at the prior hearing
should not be the judge in the subsequent trial.
" See, e.g., United States v. A Motion Picture Film, 404 F.2d 196 (2d Cir.
1968).
"A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 208 (1964).
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delays and postponements requested by the defendant has been presented
in two recent cases with contrary results. In Fontaine v. Dial" the court
found that the hearing was continually postponed on motions by the
defense. Nevertheless, the court ruled that an adversary hearing had to be
held before a valid seizure could take place, and it was inconsequential
that the hearing was not held because of delays requested by the defendant.
On the other hand, in Grove Press v. Kansas,37 the court interpreted A
Quantity of Books to require only that the defendants be afforded an
opportunity for a prior adversary hearing and held that since the
defendants themselves delayed and postponed the hearing, the court was
not bound to give them one.38
The rationale behind the defense tactic of delaying a prior hearing
is illustrated by the attempt to seize the motion picture "I Am Curious
'(Yellow)" in Greensboro, North Carolina.39 Because of the unwillingness
of a judge to grant an adversary hearing the film could not be seized;
therefore, it was shown until the final determination in a full-scale criminal
trial.4 0 Because of all the publicity attending the numerous attempts to
suppress this particular motion picture, the delay surely proved to be
profitable.41
Occasionally courts have permitted the seizure of allegedly obscene
material for evidentiary purposes42 although they clearly forbid seizure for
the purpose of suppression.43 The constitutionality of seizure for evi-
dentiary reasons requires close analysis because there are basic differences
between the two media primarily used to disseminate obscentiy-motion
pictures on the one hand and literature, including books and magazines, on
-the other. There may be no difference in effect between a seizure for
evidence and a seizure for suppression in an obscenity proceeding involving
303 F. Supp. 436 (W.D. Tex. 1969).
8 304 F. Supp. 383 (D. Kan. 1969).
8 Id. at 385.
See Greensboro Daily News, Feb. 19, 1970, § B, at 18, col. 1.
40 Id.
"1 "[I Am Curious (Yellow)] opened at the theatres Feb. 11, and has since
played to capacity audiences." Greensboro Daily News, Feb. 19, 1970, § B, at 18,
col. 1. The film was declared nonobscene at the trial, and the manager of the
theater was found not guilty. Greensboro Record, Feb. 28, 1970, § A, at 9, col. 6.
"See, e.g., Rage Books, Inc. v. Leary, 301 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
" A seizure for the suppression of the material results when a large number of
books are taken from circulation without any judicial determination of the obscenity
of the material. See Gregory v. DiFlorio, 298 F. Supp. 1360 (W.D.N.Y. 1969),
in which the court ordered the return of the books and magazines that were con-
fiscated in a wholesale seizure incident to a lawful arrest.
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a motion-picture film, but one copy of a book or a magazine that is
printed in volume may be seized as evidence in a later prosecution with-
out amounting to an actual suppression of the material.44
In City of Youngstown v. DeLoreto4 5 a state court ruled that the
taking of one copy of each magazine without a prior judicial determina-
tion of obscenity did not violate any provisions, of the Constitution. In
Rage Books, Inc. v. Leary,4" Judge Pollack, citing Tyrone, Inc. v. Wilkin-
sonie in several instances, ruled that an adversary hearing was not
required when the "normal police function of effecting an arrest and the
seizure of sample evidence of a'su-pected crime being committed"4 was
involved. He explained, "[S] uch an arrest and a limited supportiig seizure
are not tantamount to a prior restraint since the jeopardy faced is essen-
tially the restraint [on the sale of obscenity by] the obscenity law it-
self . . .,,"
A method safer and easier than an outright seizure of obscene books
or magazines for evidentiary purposes is instigation of the prosecution
simply by the purchase of sample copies." Such a tactic accomplishes two
things necessary for a successful prosecution: (1) it effects a sale of the
material, an essential element of an obscenity offense in many states,
5 '
and (2) it enables the prosecution to obtain evidence without risking a
violation of the Constitution since no seizure is involved. However, the
purchase of a book or magazine, rather than an outright seizure of one
copy, has been declared by one judge to be an unnecessary precaution.:
That a policeman is free to buy a copy of the offensive matter makes
no material or rational difference. The only deprivation from a seizure
is of a profit to the suspected lawbreaker. The police are not consti-
"See, e.g., Rage Books, Inc. v. Leary, 301 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
"19 Ohio App. 2d 267, 251 N.E.2d 491 (1969).
"301 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
' 410 F.2d 639 (4th Cir. 1969).
,Rage Books, Inc. v. Leary, 301 F. Supp. 546, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
9Id.
"See City of Youngstown v. De Loreto, 19 Ohio App. 2d 267, 275, 251 N.E.2d
491, 498 (Ct. App. 1969).
't (a) It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation, to purposely,
knowingly or recklessly disseminate obscenity.... "A person dissemi-
nates obscenity if he
(1) Sells, . . . or offers or agrees to. sell . . any obscene writing,
picture, record or other representation or embodiment of the
obscene ....
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-189.1(,) (1) (1969).
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tutionally required to fill the coffers of suspects rather than to seize
undeniable specimens as evidence.
52
Of course, seizure of the only copy of a motion picture that a theater
possesses, even for evidentary purposes, has the effect of suppressing the
film since it cannot be shown while in the state's possession. Seizing one
print of a motion picture has been analogized to confiscation of a large
number of books:
We are told that [the theater] has 300 seats. Assuming half of them
to be occupied for four showings of a film each day for a week,
over 4,000 individuals would see the film. Preventing so large a group
in the community from access to a film is no different, in light of
first amendment rights, from preventing a similarly large number of
books from being circulated.
53
Irrespective of federal precedents, several recent state cases sanction the
seizure of one copy of a film without any adversary hearing if authorities
rely on a search warrant. In People v. De Renzy 4 the court ruled that
state law-enforcement officers acting under authority of a search warrant
could seize at least one copy of an allegedly obscene film for evidence in
a later criminal prosecution without violating the first or fourth amend-
ments. In obvious contrast to Tyrone, Inc. v. Wilkinson " a search war-
rant and a seizure under it of a motion picture were held by a New York
inferior court to be valid in People v. Steinberg,5" in which the judge who
issued the warrant had viewed the film himself.
Some courts have not even required a search warrant before a seizure
of a film on the ground that a seizure incident to a lawful arrest is valid.
A Michigan court ruled in People v. Bloss5 7 that officers who had paid
admission to the theater were obligated to make the arrest when a crime
-- i.e., the showing of an allegedly obscene film, "A Woman's Urge"-was
committed in their presence. The court held that both the arrest and the
seizure incident to it were lawful. Similarly, in People v. Lake Ronkon-
koma Theater Corp.15 officers had observed the motion picture as cus-
tomers, decided that it was obscene, arrested the manager of the theater,
" Rage Books, Inc. v. Leary, 301 F. Supp. 546, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
" Bethview Amusement Corp. v. Cahn, 416 F.2d 410, 412 (2d Cir. 1969).
'- Cal. App. 2d -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 777 (Ct. App. 1969).
410 F.2d 639 (4th Cir. 1969).
60 Misc. 2d 1041, 304 N.Y.S.2d 858 (Westchester Cty. Ct. 1969).
18 Mich. App. 410, 171 N.W.2d 455 (Ct. App. 1969).
5859 Misc. 2d 438, 299 N.Y.S.2d 545 (Suffolk Cty. Dist. Ct. 1969).
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and seized the film. This seizure was permitted by the court as incident
to a lawful arrest. In People v. Hall,9 the confiscation of two allegedly
obscene motion pictures without a prior judicial inquiry was held per-
missible because the seizure was incident to a lawful arrest and was for
the purpose of obtaining and preserving evidence. A federal district judge
in Cambist Films, Inc. v. Dugga 60 permitted the seizure of a motion
picture incident to a lawful arrest after the arresting officer had viewed
the entire film. However, all other copies of the film, which had been
seized from other theaters in an area-wide raid, were ordered returned
because the officers who seized them had not viewed each one in its en-
tirety. The court acted on the basis of whether the entire film had been
seen rather than whether there had been an adversary proceeding. 1 Despite
these numerous rulings, permitting seizures of films incident to a lawful
arrest or subsequent to a valid search warrant is constitutionally dubious
because motion pictures cannot be treated as normal instrumentalities of
crime 2 in light of the potential infringement of first-amendment rights
that confiscation engenders.
The reluctance of many courts to enforce strictly the requirement of
an adversary hearing may stem from the fear that the inherent delay would
give the defendant an opportunity to splice the film and eliminate the
objectionable parts, send it out of the jurisdiction, or impair the evidence
in some other manner. However, if there is a real threat of such actions,
it can be controlled by a temporary restraining order.63 In the face of
judicial hesitancy, one judge expressed the necessity for an adversary
hearing:
The seizure of film after no more than an ex-parte determination of
probable cause is essentially a prior restraint of expression-especially
inimicable to the First Amendment-and clearly lacks the sensitivity
required by the Constitution. In fact, any procedure less sensitive than
an adversary hearing on the issue of obscenity prior to seizure of the
film, fails to meet the Constitutional requirements implicit in the First,
Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 4
60 Misc. 2d 850, 304 N.Y.S.2d 379 (Nassau Cty. Dist. Ct. 1969).
60298 F. Supp. 1148 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
6 But see McGrew v. City of Jackson, 307 F. Supp. 754 (S.D. Miss. 1969);
Bazzell v. Gibbens, 306 F. Supp. 1057 (E.D. La. 1969), in which the courts refused
to recognize the right to an adversary hearing before the seizure of motion pictures.
62 Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 730-31 (1961).
"Bethview Amusement Corp. v. Cahn, 416 F.2d 410, 412 (2d Cir. 1969).
,Fontaine v. Dial, 303 F. Supp. 436, 439 (W.D. Tex. 1969).
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POSSIBLE TECHNIQUES FOR THE ADVERSARY HEARING
IN NORTH CAROLINA
The administration and procedure of the constitutionally required
adiversafy hearing present special problems in North Carolina since the
state's General Statutes provide no mechanism by which to determine
the obscenity of any material prior to the actual trial of an alleged
offense. "The accepted rule is that the statutory scheme must make pro-
vision for a prompt, adversary judicial proceeding to determine whether
[the material] is or is not obscene: '65
The statutory deficiency in North Carolina was exposed during the
previously discussed attempt in Greensboro to prosecute the Janus
T1heatres for the showing of the motion picture "I Am Curious (Yellow)."
The judge refused the prosecutor's request, for an adversary hearing in
order that the movie could be confiscated for evidence before the scheduled
criminial trial.66 He stated that he had found "no North Carolina statute
which sets up the machinery for a n adversary hearing,""7 and that a
statute outlining such a hearing was "a matter the legislature would have
to consider."6
Even without a "specific statutory scheme for an adversary hearing
prior to seizure, it may still be possible to hold one in North Carolina.
Tyrone, Inc. v. Wilkinson," the controlling case in the Fourth Circuit,
contains language implying that there may be procedures other than
those specifically defined by a statute that will satisfy the requirement of
an adversary proceeding. The court suggested as techniques an applica-
tion for preliminary injunction or for an order to show cause why the
film should not be seized as obscene.70 If the hearing on the petition is
"designed to focus searchingly on the question of obscenity,"71 it should
meet the constitutional requirements.
Application for a Preliminary Injunction
There may -be some difficulty in using the technique of an application
for a preliminary injunction72 against the showing of a certain film or
"Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965).
Greensboro Daily News, Feb. 19, 1970, -§ B, it 1, col. 4.
Id. § B, at 18, col. 1.
6 8Id,
'6 410 F.2d 639 (4th Cir. 1969)
10 Id. at 641.
"'Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 732 (1961)
72 N.C. GE'N. STAT. §§ 1-485 to -500 (1969).
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the selling of particular books or magazines. At common law, the equitable
remedy of an injunction could not be issued to bar the commission of a
criminal offense since it was deemed that the remedy at law would be
sufficient.7" This objection can be eliminated by the enactment of a statute
specifically authorizing injunctions against the dissemination of obscenity.
The constitutional requirements for a valid statute creating injunctive
remedies to suppress allegedly obscene material have been set out by a
federal district court:
[There must be some] rule or procedure or statute of the Common-
wealth [that] restricts the state court's discretion in the granting,
continuance, or dissolution of such injunction once a preliminary
hearing is held .... [There must also be] an expedited appeal or an
unconditional right to supersedeas or a fixed time within which either
trial or appellate courts must render their judgment.74
In any case, the need for the actual issuance of an injunction after a
hearing is questionable: once it is determined that the material is in fact
obscene, the violator can be arrested, and his goods seized. If the hearing
of the request for an injunction went so far as to provide a forum for
determining the issue of obscenity, the requirement for a prior adversary
proceeding might well be constitutionally satisfied although no injunction
could actually issue because of historical precedent.
Order to Show Cause
A second possible method for holding an adversary proceeding in
North Carolina is by means of a hearing of an order to show cause75
why film, books, or magazines should not be seized as- obscene. The
defendant would be served with a copy of the order and required to
produce in court a copy of the allegedly obscene rrfaterial. If the material
was found to be obscene, then it could be seized prior to the criminal
trial. At the time of the issuance of the show-cause order, a warrant for
the arrest of the suspected violator should also be issued and served so
that a sounder foundation of jurisdiction over the individual could be
established. A: similar procedure was approved by the United States
li re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 210-11 (1888).
"' Grove Press, Inc. v. Philadelphia, 300 F. Supp. 281, 288 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
- Every clerk has-power- "
(4) To issue citations and orders to show cause to parties in all matters
cognizable in his court, and to compel. the- appearance of such parties.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 2-16(4) (1969).
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Supreme Court in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brozwn;76 however, in that
case there were specific statutory guarantees of a speedy hearing and
appropriate appellate protection.
Arrest
Another possible nonstatutory method that may be constitutionally
adequate involves the arrest of a person for violation of an obscenity
statute.7 7 Once the arrest is accomplished, there are two options open
to the prosecutor. He may seize the material as incident to a lawful
arrest (and perhaps he may not have to concern himself with the prob-
lem of an adversary hearing),78 or he may seek an adversary proceeding.
Once the accused is under the jurisdiction of the court pursuant to his
arrest, he could be ordered to bring the allegedly obscene material before
the judge for a determination of the question of obscenity prior to the
actual criminal trial. If the material was found not to be obscene, then
the charges could be dropped; all the material found to be obscene could
be confiscated and used for evidence at later criminal proceedings.
The Subpoena Duces Tecum
Still another possible means for bringing about a pre-seizure adversary
hearing is through obtaining issuance of a subpoena duces tecum.10 In
Sokolic v. Ryan,s ° a criminal prosecution, the judge outlined such a
procedure. He suggested that the prosecutor institute adversary proceed-
ings before a judicial officer through notice to the suspected offender
and a subpoena duces tecum, directed to the defendant, containing the
name of each challenged publication or film."' After the hearing on
obscenity, criminal proceedings could be undertaken if appropriate. It
" 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
"' A peace officer may without warrant arrest a person:
(1) When the person to be arrested has committed... a misdemeanor in the
presence of the officer, or when the officer has reasonable ground to believe
that the person to be arrested has committed a . . . misdemeanor in his
presence....
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-41(1) (1965).
8See notes 44-62 supra and accompanying text.
Subpoenas for the production of records, books, papers, documents or
tangible things may be issued in criminal actions in the same manner as
provided for civil actions in Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-61 (1969).
Rule 45 gives the judge broad discretion in the issuance of subpoenas. N.C. R. Civ.
P. 45.
" 304 F. Supp. 213 (S.D. Ga. 1969).
811d. at 218-19.
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is questionable, however, whether the subpoena itself would confer juris-
diction over the person without his arrest.
A variation of the above procedure was used with apparent success
in North Carolina's Seventh Judicial District.82 An arrest warrant was
issued by the magistrate and at the same time an order was served on the
defendants by the district court judge requiring them to appear at a
specified time and to bring with them copies of the allegedly obscene film.
The order further enjoined the defendants from removing or permitting
to be removed from the jurisdiction any copies of the film. After the
preliminary hearing, the motion picture was found to be obscene. After
the judge viewed the film in the presence of the defendants, he issued an
order to seize all copies of it.8"
Hearings for Issuance of Warrants
The two existing statutory provisions that are perhaps best suited to
provide an adversary hearing in North Carolina are those for the issuance
of arrest warrants8 4 and search warrants.8 5 Before an arrest warrant
is issued under section 15-20 of the North Carolina General Statutes,
the issuing judicial officer is required to examine the complaint and any
witness who may be produced by the complainant. If it appears from
such an examination that any criminal offense has been committed, he
may issue a warrant for the arrest of the suspect or, in the alternative, a
misdemeanor summons."" There is nothing in the statute to preclude
turning this application for a warrant into an adversary hearing on the
question of obscenity. The suspected offender could be notified of the
hearing and could defend against the issuance of the warrant by raising
the question of the obscenity of the materials involved. If they are found
to be obscene, then there would be just cause to issue the warrant; if not,
the warrant would not be issued, and the case would be closed.
Section 15-25 of the North Carolina General Statutes provides that
certain judicial officials may "issue a warrant to search for any contra-
band, evidence, or instrumentality of crime upon finding probable cause
"' On November 12, 1969, criminal prosecutions were instigated by Charles Win-
berry, prosecutor for the Seventh Judicial District, against the owners and operators
of the Drake Theater in Wilson for showing the film "Ladie Godiva Rides."
"' Conversation with Charles Winberry, December 12, 1969.
8 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-18 to -22 (1965), as amended (Supp. 1969).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-25 (Supp. 1969).
"' If the judge has reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant will appear,
he may issue a summons instead of an arrest warrant. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-20
(1969).
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for the search."8 7 The hearing on probable cause could easily be turned
into an adversary proceeding. The defendant could be notified of the
hearing and could be ordered to appear and bring with him the material
in question pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum.8s If at the hearing the
material was found to be obscene, the magistrate would have probable
cause to issue the search warrant, and any of the material adequately
described in the warrant could be seized.
Recommended Combination of Techniques
A combination of the procedures discussed above is recommended as
the surest method of achieving suppression of obscene materials prior
to a criminal trial in North Carolina since the state does not yet have
a specific statutory provision for an adversary hearing."" First, the
prosecutor should file with the appropriate magistrate a complaint
alleging that a violation of the obscenity laws has occurred, and he
should request a misdemeanor summons"0 for the defendant. The sum-
mons should then be served on the defendant to bring him within the
jurisdiction of the court. A subpoena duces tecum,0' ordering the de-
fendant to come before the court and to bring samples of the material
in question, should accompany the summons so that an adversary hear-
ing can be held on the question of whether the judge should issue a search
warrant. 2 An order should also be issued enjoining the party from
removing, causing, or permitting to be removed the material that is the
subject of the investigation.
Obscenity vel non should be decided in the hearing on whether there
is probable cause to issue a search warrant. If the material is deter-
mined to be obscene, the search warrant may be issued and the material
'7N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-25 (Supp. 1969).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-61 (1969). See note 79 and p. 842 supra." Another technique that might be used to combat the dissemination of obscenity
is declaring the establishment in which the undesired material was sold or exhibited
a public nuisance. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 19-1 to -6 (1965). It is doubtful, though,,
that North Carolina's nuisance statutes constitutionally provide a technique to sup-
press obscenity because:
[T]here is no rule or procedure or statute that restricts the state court's
discretion in the granting, continuance, or dissolution of such injunction once
a preliminary injunction is held.... Nor is there an expedited appeal or an
unconditional right to supersedeas or a fixed time within which either trial
or appellate courts must render their judgment.
Grove Press, Inc. v. Philadelphia, 300 F. Supp. 281, 288 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-20 (Supp. 1969).
"1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-61 (1969).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-25 (Supp. 1969).
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that is described in the warrant seized. This procedure should be
sufficient in most cases since the prior adversary hearing does not have
to be "a fully matured action at law."93
Obscenity That Is a Danger to Children
A different, less tolerant standard of constitutional protection prevails
when there is a danger that children may be exposed to obscenity. 4
North Carolina has a procedure95 for obtaining a permanent injunction
.against anyone who is "engaged in selling, distributing, or disseminating
in any manner harmful material to minors."96 Either a solicitor or a
prosecutor may commence the action by filing a complaint with a true
copy of the allegedly harmful material. The court then conducts a hearing
to determine if there is probable cause to believe that such material
is harmful to minors. If the material is found to be harmful, a summons
may be issued to the respondent. At this point, the respondent has an
opportunity to appear and defend at trial. These proceedings may result
in a permanent injunction against the respondent, thereby eliminating the
dissemination of the material.
EXTENSION OF THE ADVERSARY-HEARING REQUIREMENT
The broadest extension of the requirement for a pre-seizure adversary
hearing has recently been effected by two federal district courts.97 They
held that material must be declared obscene in the adversary proceed-
ing and the defendant must be given the opportunity to refrain from
further dissemination of those items before any criminal sanctions can
be applied. The underlying rationale is that the obscenity of material
to which the first amendment can be applied is an issue of fact to be
determined by the jury, that a person might not be held to know a fact
whereas he is presumed to know the law, and, therefore, that a violation
" Tyrone, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 410 F.2d 639, 641 (4th Cir. 1969).
"' "It is therefore altogether fitting and proper for a state to include in a statute
designed to regulate the sale of pornography to children special standards, broader
than those embodied in legislation aimed at controlling dissemination of such mate-
rial to adults." People v. Kahan, 15 N.Y.2d 311, 312, 206 N.E.2d 333, 334, 258
N.Y.S.2d 391, 392 (1965). See also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968);
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) ; Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas,
366 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1966); Chemline, Inc. v. City of Grand Prairie, 364 F.2d
721 (5th Cir. 1966).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 19-9 to -26 (Supp. 1969).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-13(a) (Supp. 1969).
" Delta Book Distributors, Inc. v. Cronvich, 304 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. La. 1969);
Sokolic v. Ryan, 304 F. Supp. 213 (S.D. Ga. 1969).
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of an obscenity law should result only when the material that has been
determined obscene in an adversary hearing is subsequently disseminated.
In Delta Book Distributions, Inc. v. Cronvichs, a three-judge district
court said:
Since prior restraint upon the exercise of First Amendment rights
can be exerted through seizure (with or without a warrant) of the
allegedly offensive materials, arrest (with or without a warrant) of
the alleged offender or through the threat of either or both seizure
and arrest, the conclusion is irresistible in logic and in law that none
of these may be constitutionally undertaken prior to an adversary
judicial determination of obscenity. °9
In Sokolic v. Ryan, 0 the court ruled that "[a]ny criminal prosecu-
tion here prior to an adversary hearing and without plaintiff having the
subsequent opportunity to refrain from selling materials determined to
be obscene is violative of his First Amendment rights."' The court
added that "suppression of the dissemination of literature can occur
only when one sells or offers for sale materials that have been previously
declared obscene in an adversary proceeding." " If the rationale of these
two cases is applied in North Carolina, it is doubtful that any conviction
for a violation of an obscenity statute could be obtained at all since
there are no legislative provisions for an adversary hearing.
CONCLUSION
If criminal prosecutions for dissemination of obscenity continue to be
considered necessary,103 statutes should be enacted in North Carolina and
all other states that conform with the constitutional requirements for
seizure of obscene materials. New York's procedure was upheld by the
United States Supreme Court in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, '4 and
the Virginia statutory scheme0" recently was accepted by the Fourth
8 304 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. La. 1969).
I' Id. at 667.
190 304 F. Supp. 213 (S.D. Ga. 1969).
01 id. at 216.
102 Id. at 217.
"'9 For an opinion that all obscenity laws should be eliminated and that the
control of obscene material should be accomplished by civil remedies, see Elison &
Graham, Obscenity: A Compromise Proposal, 30 MONT. L. REv. 123 (1969).
10, 354 U.S. 436 (1957). For details of the New York scheme that was accepted
by the Supreme Court, see 354 U.S. at 437 n.1 (1957).
... For an excellent statutory scheme dealing with the adversary hearing from
its inception to its conclusion and delicately balancing rights of the individual
without impairing the power of the state, see VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-236.3 (1960)
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